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COMMENTS
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
OF 1970: ITS ROLE IN, CIVIL LITIGATION
by Barbara M.G. Lynn
Because it vests the federal government with broad powers to regulate
American working conditions, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSHA) 1 has the potential for having a great impact on civil suits for
personal injuries. Injured persons will most likely seek to fasten civil liability
on the violation of an OSHA provision, 'and given the breadth of OSHA regu-
lations, it -is reasonable to assume that in the vast majority of accidents at
least one OSHA standard has been violated. 2 'Because of the likely utiliza-
tion of the statute in civil suits, OSHA provides an 'appropriate vehicle for
an examination of the traditional tort treatment of violated statutes ,and ad-
ministrative regulations.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine OSHA with particularity, to
analyze 'and 'to criticize 'the ways in which statutes and regulations have
shifted burdens and presumptions in civil suits, and finally, to determine the
propriety of applying the various forms of tort analysis to cases in which an
OSHA violation is a factor. Part I is 'a 'treatment of the Occupational Safety
-and 'Health Act. First, those provisions of the Act which are essential to an
evaluation of OSHA for purposes of civil litigation are discussed. Second,
OSHA -is criticized and evaluated from -a constitutional law framework. If
the constitutional problems 'are serious, the Act's subsequent civil effect
should be diminished or nullified. Third, OSHA is 'analyzed in terms of its
legislative history and intended effect. In part II 'the traditional tort treat-
ment of statutory 'and regulatory violations, through negligence per se, im-
plied right of 'action, and strict liability, is discussed. Part III draws together
the particular 'aspects of OSHA and the traditional tort framework and ana-
lyzes the proper treatment which should be accorded to OSHA in civil litiga-
tion. Finally, part IV concludes with 'an evaluation of the various rules ap-
plied to statutory violations considered in civil suits and discusses the specific
viability ,of each in cases dealing with OSHA violations.
I. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
A. Statutory Provisions
Drawing from other statutes which had affected minor portions of the
American work force, 3 the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
1. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
2. During 1972, of businesses inspected, only 25% were found to be in compliance
with OSHA standards. Williams, Be Prepared, TRIAL, July/Aug. 1973, at 14, 15.
3. See, e.g., National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities Act, 20 U.S.C. H8
954(i), (j) (1970); Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§
801-960 (1970); Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. § 35(e) (1970)(workers engaged in government contract work); Service Contract Act of 1965, 41
U.S.C. §§ 351-57 (1970) (government service suppliers). As existent federal safety
laws, these Acts were deemed standards under OSHA. See note 8 infra.
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granted authority to the Secretary of 'Labor (hereinafter referred to as the
Secretary) 'to regulate the working conditions 'of every man, woman, and
child in the 'United States.4 Although its purpose was to prevent on-the-job
injuries, rather than to provide tangible benefits for compliance, OSHA fo-
cuses on negative incentives by imposing stiff penalties for noncompliance.5
To fulfill its purpose of encouraging job safety and health, OSHA requires
each employer to: (1) "furnish to each of his employees employment and
a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are caus-
ing or -are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees,"I
and (2) comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated
under the Act. 7  The standards" referred to jin the employer's second duty
are to be promulgated under the authority of the Administrative Procedure
Act,9 so that there is some opportunity for public discussion before the regu-
latory standard becomes effective. 10  These standards are enforced to a lim-
4. "[T]he Act is applicable to each and every business that has employees." Sec-
retary of Labor v. J.A. Walder, Inc., 1 O.S.H.C. 3047, 3048 (1973). Though the scope
of the Act is phrased in terms of employers engaged in businesses affecting commerce,
it can be persuasively argued that any business conducted so as to allow the occurrence
of avoidable accidents has a potentially damaging effect on interstate commerce which
would justify its regulation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1975.3 (1973). The relative insignificance
of a particular accident is immaterial. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Only government employees are specifically excluded from coverage, to the extent that
they are covered by other federal agencies exercising statutory authority affecting occu-
pational safety and health, or to the extent that they are covered by the safety and health
regulations of state agencies acting under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2021 (1970). 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1970). As a matter of policy, the
Act is deemed inapplicable to the performance of religious services, and to individuals
employing household domestics. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1975.4(c), (i), 1975.6 (1973).
5. Penalties range from simple notice to a $10,000 fine and up to six months im-
prisonment for a violation which results in the death of an employee. See note 21 infra.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the general duty
clause].
7. id. § 654(a)(2).
8. The Act provided for the issuance within two years of "interim standards,"
composed of national consensus and established federal standards. Id. § 655(a). The
"national consensus standard" is one which "has been issued by a nationally recognized
standards-producing organization under procedures whereby it can be determined that in-
terested and affected persons have reached substantial agreement on its adoption; it was
formulated in a manner that afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be considered;
and it has been designated as such a standard by the Secretary after consultation with
appropriate federal agencies." BNA, JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 2
(1971). These standards, which included those of the American National Standards In-
stitute and the National Fire Protection Association, remained in effect only until April
28, 1973, unless particular provisions were specifically promulgated under the rules of
the Administrative Procedure Act. The federal standards, which also remained effective
until April 28, 1973, unless promulgated according to the Administrative Procedure Act,
were composed of occupational safety and health standards included in existing federal
laws, including the 1973 amendments to the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards
Act, 40 U.S.C. § 333 (Supp. 1973), and those at note 3 supra.
The Act also permits the Secretary to promulgate emergency temporary standards,
without regard to the Administrative Procedure provisions, "if he determines (A) that
employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined
to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency
standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger." 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(I)
(1970). Within six months of the promulgation of an emergency standard, the Secre-
tary must complete regular standard-setting procedures for the particular danger. Id. §
655(c)(3).
Finally, the Secretary may promulgate permanent standards. See note 10 infra. The
permanent standards are divided into three major categories-General Industry, Mari-
time, and Construction.
9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500, 553 (1967).
10. "An interested person," including a union, national standard-setting group,
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i:ted extent" through on-the-job inspections which are initiated by employee
oomplaints,12 by random selection, or by the Department of Labor in accord-
ance with its special emphasis programs' 3 targeting certain industries1 4 and
health hazards.') These inspections occur without prior warning, 16 though
they must be conducted reasonably and during regular working hours. The
employer, or his representative, and a representative of the employees are
authorized to accompany the inspector (Compliance Officer) on his walk
around the establishment, and the inspector may question the employer ' Iand
employees privately.' 8  If the inspector finds that 'a standard 9 has been vio-
lated, he must issue a de minimis notice 20 or citation, 2' depending on the im-
state, or the Labor Secretary, may propose a standard. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1) (1970).
The Secretary may then appoint an advisory committee or immediately publish the pro-
posed standard in the Federal Register. Id. Interested parties have thirty days within
which to express their views and to request a public hearing. Id. § 655(b)(3). It has
been held that such a hearing may be of an informal nature. See Borden Co. v. Free-
man, 256 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J.), afI'd, 369 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1966). Within sixty days
after the hearing the Secretary issues a rule promulgating, modifying, or reversing a
standard, and he may delay the effective date of a standard in order to familiarize em-
ployers better with its scope and meaning. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(4) (1970). See gen-
erally BNA, JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 32-36 (1971).
11. During the first year of OSHA's operation, 32,700 inspections were made in
29,505 establishments. Carter, Advising Employees Under OSHA, in PLI, OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 7, 31 (1972). The number of inspections is increas-
ing, however. The weekly average of 1,335 inspections in December 1973 was more
than double the average of December 1972. 3 BNA Occup. SAFETY AND HEALTH REP.
1219 (1974).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1970). In Aluminum Coil Anodizing Corp., 1 O.S.H.C.
1508 (1974), the Review Commission held that the Secretary must perform an inspec-
tion when a request emanates from an employee or representative of employees, but is
not obligated to do so when such a request is made by a non-employee.
13. This special emphasis, necessitated by the limited manpower available, is to be
upon "those industries or occupations where the need to assure safe and healthful condi-
tions is determined to be the most compelling." S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
1Z (1970).
14. The following five industries, having injury frequency rates more than twice the
national average of 15.2 disabling injuries per million employees working, were targeted
for special emphasis: longshoring, meat and meat products, roofing and sheet metal,
lumber and wood products, miscellaneous transportation equipment. U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BoR, ALL ABOUT OSHA 10 (1973).
15. Target health hazards are asbestos, carbon monoxide, cotton dust, lead, and
silica. Id.
16. Any person who gives advance notice of an inspection is subject to a $1,000
fine and up to six months imprisonment. 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970).
17. Given the nature of these inspections, and assuming that OSHA can be charac-
acterized as a quasi-criminal statute, the employer could exercise his fifth amendment
rights by refusing to answer any questions. See text accompanying note 132 inf ra.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2) (1970).
19. In this Comment, the terms "standard" and "regulation" are used interchange-
ably.
20. A de minimis condition is one having "no direct or immediate relationship to
job safety and health (Example: lack of toilet partitions)." ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra
note 14, at 13. A citation may be given for a non-serious violation which has "a direct
relationship to job safety and health but probably would not cause death or serious physi-
cal harm." Id. Penalties may vary according to the size of the business, gravity of
the violation, good faith of the employer, and history of past violations, but shall not
exceed $1,000. 29 U.S.C. §§ 666(c), (i) (1970).
21. A citation for a serious violation is given "where there is substantial probability
that death or serious physical harm could result and that the employer knew, or should
have known, of the hazard. (Example: absence of point-of-operation guards on punch
presses or saws)." ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 14, at 14. The test for "knew or
should have known" is "the standard of diligence . . . of a reasonably prudent employer
. . . who is safety conscious and who possesses the technical expertise which would
normally be expected of an employer engaging in that particular activity." 77 BNA Oc-
CUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER REFERENCE FILE 3105 (1972). A penalty of
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mediacy of the possible adverse effects on job safety and health resulting
from the violation. If a citation is issued, the inspector must specify a time
period for the iabatement of the violation, !and, if it is serious, he must impose
a statutory penalty. 22  If within fifteen working days following notification
of the citation and penalty the employer does not notify the Secretary of his
intent to contest the citation or proposed penalty, 23 the Secretary's citation
and assessment "shall be deemed a final order of the [Occupational Safety
and Health Review] Commission and not subject to review by any court
or agency." '24 If the employer elects to appeal, he must notify the Secretary,
and must 'also post the citation and notice of contest for the information of
his employees. 25  The (abatement order is then 'automatically stayed, unless
the Area Director determines that the employer's appeal is not in good faith
or is solely for delay or avoidance of penalties. 26  The Secretary is responsible
for notifying the Commission (OSHRC) of the appeal, and the OSHRC
grants an appeal before one of its ,administrative judges. 27  The judge issues
findings and an order affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary's citation
and/or proposed penalty. That order becomes a final order of the Com-
mission within thirty days unless a member of the Commission calls it for re-
view. 28  A final order of the OSHRC may be iappealed to the appropriate
United States Court of Appeals by ",any person adversely affected," 29 but a
stay must be specifically ordered by the circuit court in order to postpone
the enforcement of the OSHRC's abatement order. °
up to $1,000, the amount depending upon the considerations discussed above, is manda-
tory for a serious violation. Finally, citations also may be given in cases of imminent
danger, "where there is reasonable certainty that a hazard exists that can be expected
to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the hazard can be elimi-
nated through regular procedures." ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 14, at 14. If the
employer does not abate the condition immediately, the OSHA Area Director may seek
injunctive relief in a federal district court. Citations may be given for various other
violations of the Act, such as for failure to post a citation for the perusal of employees
or for failure to maintain records. All citations must state "with particularity" the na-
ture of the violation and the section of the law or regulation violated. 29 U.S.C. § 658a
(1970).
22. For 23,230 citations issued to employers during the first year after OSHA be-
came effective, proposed penalties totaled $2,291,000, or approximately $98 per citation.
Carter, supra note 11, at 31. In terms of actual penalties, however, for the first six
months of OSHA activities, the average final assessments were only $18 per penalty.
Note, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: Some Unresolved Issues and
Potential Problems, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 304, 321 n.11 (1972).
23. The Commission recently ruled that even if the penalty is not disputed by the
Secretary or the employer, it is still subject to modification by the Review Commission
while it is hearing an appeal as to the citation. Secretary of Labor v. Thorlief Larsen
& Son, 1 O.S.H.C. 1095 (1973). Employees are also permitted to contest the abatement
period through similar channels. 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1970).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1970).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.16(a) (1973).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1970).
27. Id. § 661(i).
28. Id. In its first year of existence, the OSHRC exercised its power to review
the findings of its administrative judges in only 6% of all cases heard. Cohen, The
Occupational Safety and Health Act: A Labor Lawyer's Qverview, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 788,
797 (1972), citing Address by Chairman Robert D. Moran, ABA Labor Law Section
Meeting, Aug. 15, 1972.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
30. Id. Additionally, no objection that was not urged before the OSHRC may be
considered by the court, unless it can be established that the failure to raise the point
earlier should be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. If the court deter-
1002 ,[Vol. 28
COMMENTS
It is clear that under the authority of the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution, 3' OSHA preempts 'all conflicting state health and safety
plans.3 2 OSHA does provide, however, that a state may assume the responsi-
bility for the -development and enforcement 'of occupational safety and health
standards in its jurisdiction, by submitting a plan to be approved by the Secre-
tary of Labor.3 3
OSHA has several other provisions which are relevant to a discussion of
the effect which an OSHA violation and possible administrative adjudication
of guilt should have in a subsequent civil suit. Employees 'are granted certain
rights under the Act, in 'addition to those previously alluded to. They may
'appeal the abatement 'order of the Secretary to the OSHRC, testify at a hear-
Ing to discuss an employer's request for a variance,3 4 bring an action for 'a
writ of mandamus if 'the Secretary refuses to seek appropriate relief under
the Act,3 5 'and file complaints with the Secretary if they are discriminated
against by their employers for pursuing any of these rights.3 6  Employers are
charged with the responsibility 'of keeping employees informed of develop-
ments under OSHA, 'as well as with keeping records of accidents and inju-
ries. 3 7 Failure to keep such records can 'result in a penalty of up to $1,000.38
B. Constitutional Aspects
OSHA presents some serious constitutional problems which should carry
significant weight in determining the effect which 'an administrative adjudica-
tion should 'have in a later civil action. The constitutional -uncertainties are
concentrated in two areas: 39 the invasion of fourth amendment rights be-
cause of the Compliance Officer's purported ability to search an employer's
premises without a warrant, and the invasion of fifth and sixth amendment
mines that there is a need for additional evidence to be taken, it will remand the case
to the OSHRC. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1970). For a discussion of the circumstances under
which a federal statute precludes the enforcement of state laws on the same subject, see
Hornberger, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 22-
24 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
33. Such a plan must be "at least as effective in providing safe and healthful em-
ployment and places of employment" as is the federal plan. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (2)
(1970). For a discussion of whether such a plan would have to include a general duty
clause, see Note, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: State Plans and the
General Duty Clause, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (1973). Thus far, nineteen states have ap-
proved plans, with three other states awaiting legislative action on plans which they have
submitted. 3 BNA OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1196-1200 (1974).
34. A variance may be granted to an employer if he shows by a preponderance
of the evidence that the conditions or methods used by him "will provide employment
and places of employment . . . as safe and healthful as those which would prevail if
he complied with the standard." 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (1970).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1970).
36. Id. § 660(c). This provision was probably based upon the belief that the em-
ployee's fear of losing his job if he reported violations had limited the deterrent effects
of other safety statutes. See Lemert & Sours, What the Employer's Counsel Should
Know About the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, BARRISTER, April 1974,
at 23, 26.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1970).
38. Id. § 666(c).
39. See Stokes, Legal Considerations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, in PLI, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 61, 142-54 (1972); Com-
ment, OSHA: Employer Beware, 10 HOUSTON L. REv. 426, 437-46 (1973).
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rights since the Act is essentially penal in character, 40 but does not provide
the right to face one's accusers, or the right to jury trial, which are essential
elements of due process.
OSHA seems to indicate that he Compliance Officer may search the em-
ployer's place of business without 'a warrant, 41 but it is quite clear that the
employer may refuse to permit the search in the absence of a warrant.42 In
the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court43 and See v. City of
Seattle44 the United States Supreme Court indicated that fourth amendment
protection extends to administrative searches which 'have the character of a
criminal investigation. In Camara 'this reasoning was applied to a housing
inspection, while in See a fire inspection search was at issue. Though these
cases indicated that a warrant was required in -the non-emergency situation,
both made it clear that a warrantless search in an emergency situation would
be permissible 'and that area enforcement inspections without particular prob-
able cause would be upheld on the basis of the reasonableness of the searches
in areas where violations were generally probable. 45  Obviously, this ap-
proach diminishes the meaningfulness of the constitutional objection in
OSHA cases, for since inspections are generally based upon either employee
complaints or upon the probable occurrence of violations in special emphasis
areas, the somewhat watered-down probable cause requirement for adminis-
trative searches will be relatively easy to satisfy. 46
The second major constitutional problem involves the denial of fifth and
sixth amendment protections, such as due process-the right ,to face one's ac-
cusers, and the right to jury trial, both of which should be granted since OSHA
40. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commissioner of Pa., 380 U.S. 693 (1965),
a forfeiture case, which was characterized as quasi-criminal by the Supreme Court, and
thus constitutional guarantees were ruled applicable. The constitutional objections to
OSHA were raised in Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga.),
af'd mem., 409 U.S. 1070 (1972), but the court refused to hear them because the appel-
lant had not exhausted its administrative remedies.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970).
42. In fact, the Secretary's regulations indicate that the Compliance Officer is to
terminate his inspection if an employer refuses him permission to enter. The Compli-
ance Officer is then to report the refusal to the Area Director, who will secure compul-
sory process if necessary. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1973).
43. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
44. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
45. 387 U.S. at 539; 387 U.S. at 545.
46. In contrast to Camara and See is Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971),
where the Court held that New York's home visitation program for welfare recipients
was not a search in the criminal law context of the fourth amendment as it was in no
sense a criminal investigation. The Supreme Court concluded that termination of relief
benefits, rather than a forcible entry, was the proper consequence of the refusal to permit
the search. Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), in which the Supreme
Court upheld the legality of a warrantless search under the Gun Control Act of 1968.
The Court stressed the need for frequent, unannounced inspections to prevent violent
crime, and distinguished See because periodic inspections for fire hazards were sufficient.
The Court also emphasized that the negligible protection which would be afforded by
a warrant was outweighed by the frustration of legislative purpose which the securing
of a warrant would cause. The law enforcement characteristics of OSHA are obviously
more similar to those of the statutes involved in Camara and See than to that in Wyman,
but if the Court rules that the Biswell analysis is applicable to occupational safety
searches, perhaps a warrant will not be required. On balance, however, it appears that
the Camara-See approach will be followed in OSHA cases, for in cases of urgency, either
analysis would allow a warrantless search, while in nonemergencies the Biswell reason-
ing does not seem apt.
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has several penal characteristics. 47 For example, although it is designed to
protect the public, the penalties exacted under OSHA do not compensate
parties wronged by a violation, but instead are earmarked for the 'United
States Treasury. 48  Furthermore, the relatively severe fines, discretionary in-
creased penalties based primarily on the gravity of the offense and the culpa-
bility of 'the employer,49 'and variances in penalty according to the extent of
the injury, all tend 'to indicate that OSHA is essentially penal. 50  Even so,
the Act is self-executing, forcing the employer to go on the offensive if he
does not accept the Compliance Officer's assessment. Unlike 'other 'acts,5 '
where before a penalty is inflicted the individual receives a hearing unless
he waives it, OSHA reverses 'the procedure and presumes a waiver unless
the employer establishes otherwise. Further, OSHA denies the employer the
right to face the party who filed the complaint against him, and denies him
the right to a jury trial.
Subsidiary problems of a constitutional nature include 'the judicial charac-
ter of the administrative proceedings under OSHA; the possibility of in-
creased or continued penalties if 'the employer appeals, which produces a
chilling effect on 'the pursuit 'of appellate review;5 2 and, finally the vagueness
and :ambiguity of the general duty clause which arguably gives inadequate
notice of 'an employer's obligations under the Act.
C. Purpose and Intended Effect of OSHA
In response to grim statistics in the fields of occupational safety and
health, 5  OSHA was designed to encourage better protection of employees
by eliminating ,the inadequacies which had plagued state regulation of occu-
pational safety 'and health. 14 'It is clear that employees were within 'the scope
of OSHA's protection, for the hearings before both 'the House 'and Senate
47. To determine if a law is penal, it is necessary to consider "the wrong to be
redressed, and whether the proscribed act injures the public as opposed to the individ-
ual." Comment, supra note 39, at 437.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1970).
49. Consideration is to be given to the size of the business, the gravity of the viola-
tion, the employer's good faith, and any history of previous violations. Id. § 666(i).
See also note 20 supra.
50. See Stokes, supra note 39, at 144; cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144 (1963) (deportation hearings held penal in character).
51. See, e.g., Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 333-35 (1970); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 216 (1970).
52. This effect is highlighted by the possibility that a penalty may be increased
even if only the citation is appealed. See note 23 supra.
53. In 1968, 14,300 persons were killed and more than two million were disabled
as a result of industrial accidents. See Statement of Secretary of Labor Shultz, Hearings
on H.R. 843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 4294, H.R. 13373 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor
o0 the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 112 (1969);
Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm.
on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 1554 (1970). Such
losses also cost 250 million man days of work, at an annual loss to the gross national
product of over $8 billion. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
54. During the congressional hearings on OSHA, state laws on occupational safety
and health were repeatedly criticized for the differences among them and consequent
lack of any national program in this area, the lack of vigor in their enforcement, and
the general inadequacy of their standards. The states' expenditures on job safety in
1967 averaged forty cents per worker. Hearings on S. 2864 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 894 (1968).
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Committees evidenced an overwhelming concern with three things: the po-
tentially damaging effects of certain chemicals utilized in various facets of
production and manufacturing, the tragic social 'and economic effects of em-
ployment accidents, and the proposed administrative structure of OSHA. 55
The clear emphasis, however, was upon decreasing the !amount of danger to
which employees were subject. While, like the employer, the employee has
duties of compliance with standards, rules, and regulations applicable to his
conduct,56 OSHA is silent -as to penalties for violations of these duties. In
fact, the legislative history of ithe employee duty clause, which only appeared
in the Senate version of the Act, reveals that it was not meant "to diminish
in any way the employer's compliance responsibilities or his responsibility to
assure compliance by his own employees.5 7 'Final responsibility for compli-
ance with the requirements of the Act remains with the employer."58
Having established a congressional intent to protect employees by OSHA,
it is still unclear whether third parties not directly involved in the employ-
ment relationship, but subject to the same dangers of hazardous safety and
health conditions, were intended to fall within the protective scope of OSHA.
The statute itself is silent on this point, as is 'the legislative history, although
it would seem that the number and severity of work related injuries and ill-
nesses,59 which were highlighted in committee hearings, would be decreased by
extending the protection of the Act to all parties subject to the harmful results
of avoidable accidents. In promulgating the OSHA regulations, the Secretary
has apparently not concurred in this approach to fulfilling the legislative pur-
pose. The regulations indicate that "[i]n the event a standard protects on
its face ,a class of persons larger 'than employees, 'the standard shall be appli-
cable under this part only to employees 'and their employment and places
of employment." 60 One commentator 'has interpreted this regulation to mean
that 'the interests of third parties are not protected by OSHA itself, and that
they are, therefore, to be vindicated in private actions. 6 ' The view that third
parties are not directly protected by OSHA seems to be 'an eminently reason-
able one, but it is 'not nearly so clear that a private action using the OSHA
violation as evidence of negligence was intended to serve as the substitute
55. The Nixon Administration and management supported a bill which would have
completely separated the powers of rule-making and enforcement. Most Democrats and
the labor movement favored the resting of complete authority in the Secretary of Labor.
The OSHRC, a three-man appellate review board, was a compromise between these two
positions. See BNA, JOB SAFETY & HEALTH AcT OF 1970, at 16-21 (1971).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1970).
57. See notes 145-51 infra, and accompanying text regarding the effect of an em-
ployee's assumption of the risk or contributory negligence in OSHA cases.
58. S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 53, at 10.
59. Id. at 1.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(d) (1973). Similarly, at least one commentator believes
that since the thrust of the Act was to protect employees, Congress had no intention
of extending the scope of OSHA's protection to reach third parties. See Address by
James Mehaffy, Texas Association of Defense Counsel Meeting, in Guadalajara, Mexico,
Apr. 19, 1974, in which the speaker took the position that legislative silence on this
point indicated an intent to exclude coverage. Perhaps an analysis of the policies to
be served by extending coverage would be more appropriate. See note 144 infra and
accompanying text.
61. Comment, Federal Common Law Remedies Under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 47 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1972).
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for OSHA's lack of direct benefit to third perSOns. 6 2
II. TRADITIONAL TREATMENT OF STATUTORY
VIOLATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY
A. Violation as Negligence Per Se
The question of what effect the violation of a statute should have in a sub-
sequent civil action is one about which authors have debated for the past sixty
years. 6 3  The general theory upon which 'admissibility of the violation has
been based can appropriately be termed "statutory concretisation. ' 16 4  The
legislature, through a statute, fixes 'a standard of care, anticipating potential
problems which even the reasonable man might have ignored. In effect, the
legislature has foreseen the probable injuries to be caused by non-adherence
to the standard, so a subsequent jury evaluation of the foreseeability of the
harm would be redundant and illogical. This approach necessarily cul-
minates in the view that violation of the statute is negligence in itself. Of
course, proximate cause must still be established and excuses for the violation
would probably be heard, 65 but it is obvious that the plaintiff's burden of
proof is greatly eased. Many courts which 'have applied this doctrine have
done so in fairly limited terms, focusing 'their analysis on two points: the risk
against which the 'act in question was designed to protect, and the class of
persons which was to be protected. If the risk which culminated in the injury
were not that to be guarded against,66 or if the plaintiff were not in the pro-
tected class, 67 then the statutory violation would not constitute negligence per
se, but only evidence of negligence or no evidence at all.
To its credit, ,the negligence per se 'approach has two reasonable character-
istics. Since the defendant has violated a statute enacted for the benefit of
62. See notes 60 supra and 144 infra and accompanying texts.
63. Compare Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317(1914), with Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Ac-
tions, 28 TEXAs L. REV. 143 (1949), and F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 17.6
(1956).
64. Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MODERN L.
REv. 233, 252 (1960).
65. For examples of cases in which courts have discussed the availability of excuses
in negligence per se cases, see Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d
581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947); Wilson v. Long, 221 Iowa 668, 266 N.W. 482 (1936); Tedla
v. Elman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939); Bissell v. Seattle Vancouver Motor
Freight Ltd., 25 Wash. 2d 68, 168 P.2d 390 (1946). But see Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929).
66. This analysis originated in Gorris v. Scott, [1874] L.R. 9 Ex. 125, where the
defendant violated a law requiring carriers by water to provide separate pens for trans-
ported animals. As a result of the violation, the plaintiff's sheep were washed over-
board in a storm. The court held that the statute was designed to provide for proper
sanitation, and not to prevent the type of accident which occurred, and consequently
held that the violation did not constitute negligence per se. But see Marshall v. Isthmian
Lines, Inc., 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court held that although the statute
was not designed to prevent the specific accident which occurred, it would still be ad-
missible as evidence for the jury to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the
defendants' conduct.
67. See, e.g., Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N.E. 81 (1935); cf. Butler v. L.
Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961), where the court held that the viola-
tion of the statute was admissible as some evidence of negligence although the injured
plaintiff was not in the precise class to be protected.
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others and thus has committed an antisocial act,6s it is reasonable that com-
munity opprobrium should be automatically attached to his act. Further-
more, as was argued by Dean Thayer in his classic article on this subject,6 9
the reasonable man would never violate the law, so 'all statutory violations
would naturally be .negligent70 and unreasonable in themselves. Thayer op-
posed the commonly accepted approach to negligence per se of attempting
to determine the intent of the legislature, because, in his view, it was impos-
sible to determine such intent, and, in all likelihood, the legislators never con-
sidered the problem.
'Despite ,this persuasive reasoning, the negligence per se approach has sev-
eral major flaws. One potential hazard is that the jury is likely to confuse
the unreasonableness of the violation with the cause of the accident, 71 and
hence may base its decision upon the violation of 'the law, rather than upon
an application of the reasonable man standard to the acts leading to 'the in-
jury.72 Furthermore, the application of the doctrine may be overly harsh in
a given case. For example, a violation of one of the multitude of automobile
regulations, 73 such as that requiring a brightly illuminated headlight, may in
'effect be the cause of an accident, yet to treat such a violation as negligence
in itself without considering the actor's knowledge and opportunity to correct
the defect before the accident would be effectively adopting strict liability
and thus stepping far beyond the reasonable man standard. 74
'Many courts, concerned that the determination of what is reasonable in
a given case should be left ito the exclusive province of the jury, have 'admit-
ted the standard as some evidence of negligence. 75 In other words, the jury
would weigh the fact that the legislature had passed upon this type of activity
and had determined that it was dangerous, and would consider this determi-
nation in arriving at the prototype of a reasonable man. 76 The difficulty in
68. See Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L.
REv. 361, 376 (1932). In Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943),
the court applied the antisocial act reasoning by considering the violation of a traffic
ordinance to constitute negligence per se although it was established that the regulation
was irregularly authorized.
69. See Thayer, supra note 63. Thayer argued that only an affirmative act, as
opposed to an act of omission, could give rise to a duty answerable in tort.
70. It could even be argued that the violation of a statutory prohibition constitutes
an intentional tort, for each individual is deemed to know the law, and therefore could
not attribute his noncompliance to mere negligence in learning of the prohibition.
71. See Lowndes, supra note 68, at 369.
72. Thayer would not consider this a flaw, for he would argue that it is the viola-
tion of the law which should be weighed most heavily by the jury in determining the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. See Thayer, supra note 63.
73. Cf. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (1920). In Ross
v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), the court's application of the negligence
per se rule may appear harsh, although it represents a correct use of the rule. There
the defendant's agent violated a traffic ordinance which prohibited drivers from leav-
ing keys in their vehicles. The automobile was stolen, and ran over the plaintiff.
Since the statute's design was to prevent auto theft by reckless or inexperienced drivers
and because the violation led to a foreseeable result, the case was appropriate for an
application of the negligence p~r se rule.
74. Two commentators have argued that "neither in fact nor in law do others have
the right under all circumstances to rely on the actor's obedience to statutes." F. HAR-
PER & F. JAMES, supra note 63, at 1000.
75. See, e.g., Silvia v. Pennock, 253 Iowa 779, 113 N.W.2d 749 (1962); Carlock
v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935).
76. Wigmore argues that the statute or ordinance "is virtually a custom or usage
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this approach, as was previously alluded to, 77 is that the violation of the law,
as opposed to variance from a custom, would be likely to 'have a much more
detrimental and prejudicial effect on the defendant's case.
Finally, some courts have ignored the statutory violation, allowing it -to
have no influence in determining what behavior is negligent. Traffic viola-
tions 'have often been treated in this manner, primarily -because of the "recog-
nition that people plead guilty to traffic charges for reasons of convenience
and without much regard to guilt and collateral consequences. '7 8  The facts
that the procedural safeguards in traffic courts may be perfunctory, especially
because of the less formal structure of the proceedings and infrequent use
of jury trials, and that the plea may -be given undue weight in large civil suits
should also be stressed.79  A number of states have resolved this problem
through legislation.80
'In any case, if the statutory standard is -admissible, 'the court usually takes
judicial notice of it.8 ' So long as the court deems it relevant 'to the standard
of care issue, there seems to be no evidentiary problem in having the statute,
or 'administrative regulation, brought before the court.8 2
B. Implying a Right of Action from the Statute8 3
A statute may be utilized in 'a more indirect fashion in a civil suit, by serv-
ing as a basis for implying a separate civil liability.84  Under this approach,
having orthodox status" and that it should constitute either negligence per se or be no
evidence of negligence. 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE § 416(6) (3d ed. 1940).
77. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
78. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 265, at 636 (E. Cleary
ed. 1972). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1307 (1951).
79. See Annot., supra note 78, at 1290.
80. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.16 (Page 1969) (forbidding the use of
a conviction record in a civil suit unless the conviction was by confession in open court);
TEx. CODE CRrM. PROc. ANN. art. 27.14 (Supp. 1973) (establishing that payment of
a fine for a moving traffic violation will be treated as a plea of nolo contendere, and
consequently will not constitute an admission of guilt usable elsewhere). Guilty pleas
in criminal cases are generally admissible, but not conclusive, in subsequent civil actions.
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1968);
Johnson v. Tucker, 383 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
81. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 78, § 335, at 777; UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
9.
82. For a discussion of the admissibility of safety codes and industry practices
which have not been enacted into law, see Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and
Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1965); Comment, Admissibility
of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards in Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L. REv. 581
(1970).
83. For the purposes of this Comment, the effects of statutory and regulatory viola-
tions shall be discussed together, but it is noteworthy that Professor Morris, supra note
63, considered administrative regulations separately because they were not promulgated
directly by the legislature.
84. See, e.g., cases cited in P. BATOR, P. MIsH IN, D. SHAPIRo, H. WECHSLER, HART
AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-800 (1973);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1970) (fourth amendment); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78n(a), 78aa (1970)); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288
(1960) (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1970)); Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 301(a) (1970)); Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1970) (Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §9 151(6), 152(3), (4), (10) (1972)); Goldstein
v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (Public Utility
Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1970)); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
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which in its practical effect closely resembles that of negligence per se,85 the
statute is deemed to imply 'that a violation will make the actor subject -to addi-
tional civil liability. This ,approach shares the same 'fallacy which Thayer
criticized in the negligence per se area. There is generally no intent to be
construed, for the legislators never considered the subject of the statute's civil
effect. One 'author who advocated ,the implication of private civil remedies
from violations of statutes realized, as Thayer did, the meaninglessness of the
examination of non-existent legislative intent, and instead based his support
for the doctrine on policy grounds.8 6 In other words, when the policy of the
act in question would be served by implying a private civil remedy, the courts
should be encouraged ,to do so.
The implied right of 'action approach apparently originated in the English
case of Couch v. Steel,8 7 where a statute requiring a shipowner to have cer-
tain -medicines on board was violated. Although the statute imposed a pen-
alty payable to the informer, but was silent 'as to further civil liability, ,the
court 'allowed the injured sailors to sue for damages. In this country .the doc-
trine received its major impetus from the case of Texas & Pacific Railway
v. Rigsby,8s where the United States Supreme Court determined th'at the vio-
lation of the Safety Appliance Act"9 was wrongful in itself, and when injury
to 'an individual member of 'the protected class resulted, ithen the right to re-
cover damages from the violator would be implied. 0 The question of what
defenses would be available was not discussed by 'the court, for the Act stated
specifically that an employee could not be said :to 'have assumed the risk of
a violation, and contributory 'negligence was not an issue.91
The courts 'have applied various forms of reasoning in determining when
it is appropriate to imply a private civil remedy. If the legislative intent is
available -to be construed, then the courts will do so. If it is unclear or non-
existent, however, the courts find themselves in the policy making 'arena and
have ,taken various approaches.9 2 Some courts 'have taken the position that
200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§
1302(c), 1374 (1970)). Examples of denial of the implication of a private right of
action are Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543 (9th
Cir. 1954) (Motor Carriers Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970)); Guthrie v. Alabama
By-Prods. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1971) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)). See Symposium-Private Rights from Federal
Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 454 (1968); Note, Pri-
vate Rights of Action Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 11 HoUSTON L. REv.
699 (1974).
85. "Holding that the violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se does not
differ substantially from holding that the violation of a criminal statute creates a direct
civil liability." Lowndes, supra note 68, at 366.
86. See Morris, supra note 63. For an exhaustive discussion of the absurdity of
attempting to divine a nonexistent congressional intent, see Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957).
87. 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1854).
88. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
89. 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
90. The application of the negligence per se approach would most likely have led
to a similar result.
91. A private right of action is no longer implied under the Safety Appliance Act.
See Jacobson v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 909 (1954).
92. For a discussion of these approaches, with an emphasis on the implication of
private remedies from federal common law, see Comment, supra note 61.
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a private right of iaction should be implied unless a contrary intention is
clearly evidenced by the legislature. 9 'In other cases, the courts 'have held
that no private remedy will be implied unless the act itself provides grossly
inadequate or nonexistent remedies. In Breitwieser v. KMS Industries,
Inc.,94 for example, no private right of action was implied from 'the oppressive
child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,9 ' since criminal pen-
alties were available within the Act and workmen's compensation was avail-
able to supplement it.6 Finally, some courts have -taken the approach that
legislative silence evidences an intent not to provide for a private remedy,
so in the absence of clear legislative intent otherwise, no private right will
be implied.9 7
The courts generally do not separate into the three concise categories dis-
cussed above. Usually, the analysis of the implied right of action is based
on a case-by-case approach, which tries to reason from the legislative history,
to weigh competing interests and to balance -the various policies which might
best 'be served by action or inaction. As ia general rule, courts have been
most willing to recognize private rights of action based on regulatory statutes
providing for no direct remedial relief to the injured party, partly because
of the "realization that agencies cannot investigate and prosecute every viola-
tion within their respective areas of expertise,"' )" and partly because the
agency may be unable to rectify 'a particular type of injury.99 Finally, the
courts should consider the relative merits of implying a federal remedy as
opposed to relegating the plaintiff to 'a remedy under state law.
'In short, the "case for implication"' 0 0 of a private right of action is strong-
est where state remedies are unavailable, inadequate, 01 or ineffective and
where the public policy of the act would be obviously furthered by individual
enforcement.10 2  Of course, the faimess of implication in each case is 'an im-
portant consideration, as it is when a statutory violation is considered to con-
stitute negligence per se.
93. See, e.g., Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (action under
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1970), which made it a crime to convert
assets of a registered investment company).
94. 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972); accord, Square v. Model Farm Dairies, [1939]
1 All E.R. 259 (Ct. App.).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1970).
96. 467 F.2d at 1394. The remedies available to supplement this Act are very sim-
ilar to those available to supplement OSHA.
97. See, e.g., Wynn v. Sullivan, 294 'Mass. 562, 3 N.E.2d 236 (1936). In the
"snowshovel" cases, courts have held that the breach of a statutory duty to keep side-
walks in safe condition does not constitute negligence per se. See, e.g., Western Auto
Supply v. Phelan, 104 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1939); Clark v. Stoudt, 73 N.D. 165, 12 N.W.2d
708 (1944). Both cases stressed the lack of a common law duty to keep the sidewalks
clean for the benefit of third persons.
98. Note, Private Remedy for Violation of the Oppressive Child Labor Provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act -Will Not Be Implied, 51 TEXAs L. REV. 804, 806
(1973).
99. Id.
100. Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HArv. L.
REV. 285, 292 (1963).
101. See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947), where a private
right of action was implied from the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1970).
102. The implication of these remedies and the consequent federal judicial lawmak-




C. Strict Liability and Defenses to Violation of a Statute
Once it is determined that a statutory or regulatory violation constitutes
negligence per se or implies a private remedy, it is necessary to determine
what effect those approaches will have on defenses which would normally
be available to the plaintiff. In other words, it must be determined whether
the violation should be treated as strict liability in a civil suit, so that the
defendant will not be able to argue that the plaintiff assumed the risk or was
contributorily negligent, or whether these defenses should be available as in
a normal tort action.10 3  As a general rule, the courts have barred the as-
sumption of risk defense in statutory negligence cases. In Jones v. Ross,'0 4
for example, she Texas Supreme Court held that where certain design re-
quirements were specified by law for the protection of employees, noncompli-
ance would operate -to deprive the employer of the opportunity ,to establish
assumption of the risk.10 5  The contributory negligence defense, on the other
hand, has been generally permitted by 'the courts even in negligence per so
cases.' 0 6 In Phipps v. S.S. Santa Maria,10 7 for example, the court considered
the plaintiff's negligence in a case regarding the unseaworthiness of a vessel
in violation of the longshoremen's safety 'and health regulations.' 08  At least
one court, however, has ruled that the contributory negligence defense is
available only where 'the plaintiff was grossly negligent, 1 9 while the Restate-
ment of Torts takes the position that both defenses are available unless the
statute's intent is to place the total responsibility for 'the risk upon 'the defend-
ant.110
The final consideration for the use of a statute in a related civil suit in-
volves the effect of compliance with a statutory standard of care. The judi-
103. Contributory negligence has been replaced in Texas by modified comparative
negligence. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. 1974). A third defense
which has been available in Texas negligence cases is the Delhi-Taylor defense, which
insulates a landowner or employer from liability if he warns a contractor or the con-
tractor's employees of the danger. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir.
1960); Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967). However, in
Armstrong v. Chambers & Kennedy, 340 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Tex. 1972), the court-held
that this defense was unavailable in a case which involved a statutory duty to comply
with safety regulations.
104. 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022 (1943). The negligence per se rule would not,
however, support the imposition of exemplary damages. Id. at 419-20, 173 S.W.2d at
1024.
105. Accord, Hewitt v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 404 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (as-
sumption of risk barred under a statute which required an employer to furnish and main-
tain a reasonably safe place of employment); Osborne v. Salvation Army, 107 F.2d 929(2d Cir. 1939) (window washer without safety belt, both assumption of risk and contrib-
utory negligence defenses barred). But see Rittenberry v. McKee, 337 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1960), error ref. n.r.e, where the court held that where an employee
knew of the dangers of an unguarded elevator shaft that the defense of volenti non fit
injuria was available. Since Rittenberry also involved the employee of an independent
contractor, and since by the rule of Adam Dante v. Sharp, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972),
the distinction between volenti (contract) and assumption of the risk (tort) is no longer
accepted in Texas, the case is of doubtful authority.
106. See, e.g., Peninsular Tel. Co. v. Dority, 128 Fla. 106, 174 So. 446 (1937);
Burnett v. Fort Worth Light & Power Co., 112 S.W. 1040 (Tex. 1908); Bock Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 415 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967); ac-
cord, Caswell v. Worth, 119 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1856).
107. 418 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969).
108. 25 C.F.R. § 1504.1 (1973).
109. Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 483, 496f (1965).
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cial approach has generally been to consider the statute or regulation as rep-
resenting a minimum standard, so that compliance would not necessarily sat-
isfy the reasonable man standard.111  It can be 'argued that compliance
should be 'at least some evidence for the jury since the defendant complied
with the standard of -a reasonable legislator or 'administrator. 1 2 If -the stand-
ard is higher than the reasonable man standard, however, the reasoning of
the negligence per se rule would ,apply in urging that ,the jury should not have
the option to pass independently on the actor's reasonableness.
III. EFFECT OF OSHA IN A CIVIL SUIT'"
The particular characteristics of the Occupational Safety ,and Health Act
establish it as 'an interesting model to explore the various effects which the
violation of a statute or regulation can and should have in a related civil case.
In determining whether an OSHA violation should constitute negligence per
se, evidence of negligence, or no negligence, certain factors must be high-
lighted. First, the manner in which "guilt" under OSHA was adjudicated
in a particular case should be a major factor in making subsequent use of
the violation. Because the citation is similar to a traffic summons 1 4 and be-
cause ninety-five percent of the employers cited pay without protest' 5 to
avoid dangerous publicity 'and a costly administrative battle, it is submitted
that bare payment should be of little or no effect. In fact, a primary motiva-
tion of an employer in paying the fine may be to prevent the creation of a
record from which civil liability may be adduced.1 6  Just as traffic offenders
who enter a plea of nolo contendere are not treated as having made admis-
sions for purposes of subsequent civil actions,1 7 so should those employers
who pay fines not have to fear that such payment will be taken as evidence
of negligence. A ruling that payment is an admission of negligence would en-
courage more contests of citations. Given the manpower shortages"18
plaguing the administrative apparatus of the Act even when the vast ma-
jority of the citations are paid immediately, it is not highly speculative -to
assume that such a change in rules would tax the system beyond capacity.
If the employer contests 'the citation and receives an administrative hear-
111. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 203 (4th ed. 1971); Larsen
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Schneider v. United States, 188
F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
112. See Morris, supra note 63, at 157.
113. The Secretary apparently anticipated that the reports of investigations would
be of some interest in civil litigation, for he promulgated an entire series of regulations
which deals with the subject of "Administration Witnesses and Documents in Private
Litigation." See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1906.1-.7 (1973). Records of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration are available for public inspection. Id. § 1906.7. The gen-
eral rule of evidence is that all records prepared by a public officer pursuant to a legal
duty are admissible insofar as they are relevant, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
See 30 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence §§ 991, 1002 (1967).
114. Jensen, Mohr & Stem, Administration of the OSH Act in the Face of Criticismfrom Industry and Labor, 11 AM. Bus. L.J. 37, 41 (1973), quoting Assistant Secretary
of Labor G. Guenther.
115. Id.
116. Lemert & Sours, supra note 36, at 31.
117. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 78, at 636.
118. As of Jan. 1, 1974, 800 Compliance Officers were employed by OSHA. See
3 BNA Occup. SAFE'Y & HEALTH REP. 1279 (1974).
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ing, and possibly judicial review, there would be more justification for admit-
ting the results of these hearings, either as evidence for or against negligence,
than if the employer merely paid the fine. Since the employer 'took the op-
portunity to marshal his case and to prove his innocence, it would not be
unfair for the results of those efforts to be used in subsequent civil litigation
involving the employer. There 'are two problems with making -this distinction
based upon the extent of the appeal taken. First, this rule would discourage
employers from appealing, for by doing so they would risk making a record
which could be used against them in subsequent civil litigation. The effect
would be to contribute to the previously criticized"19 chilling effect of the
present OSHA appeal system. Secondly, the employer might not be pursuing
his remedies as forcefully against the citation, when, for example, 'a $1,000
claim is involved, as -he might were he to know ,that the outcome could be
determinative in a subsequent civil suit for a much greater amount.120
Another factor, along with ,the manner of guilt determination, which is im-
portant in analyzing the proper effect of ,an OSHA violation in a civil suit
is the type of provision violated. Totally 'different forms of analysis would
be 'appropriate for a violation of the general duty clause and for a violation
of 'a specific regulation. As to the general duty clause, it is first necessary
to ianalyze the effect of the clause on the common law duty to which the em-
ployer would be subject without it. In fact, the general duty clause is virtu-
ally a restatement of the employer's common 'law duty to provide a reason-
ably safe working place for his employees.' 2  The Senate Committee on
Labor 'and Public Welfare concluded that the general duty clause "merely
restates that each employer shall bring no adverse effects to the life and
health of their employees throughout the course 'of their employment."' 22  In
one respect, the general duty clause can be said to be more lenient than 'the
common law duty, since -the employer is seemingly charged with protecting
his employees only from recognized, rather than from 'merely foreseeable,
hazards. In fact, however, 'the statute has been interpreted by the Depart-
ment of Labor as embodying the reasonable man standard. A recognized
hazard is 'a condition "of common knowledge or general recognition in the
particular industry in which it occurs 'and is detectable (1) by means of the
senses . . . or (2) is of such wide, general recognition as a hazard in -the
industry that even if it is not detectable by means of 'the senses, there are
generally known and accepted tests for its existence which should make it
known to 'the employer.' 23  One might argue that OSHA requires slightly
119. See note 23 supra, and note 52 supra and accompanying text.
120. A similar problem arises in the context of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
For this reason many states have limited by statute the estoppel effect of the decisions
of a court of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226a
(1971).
121. See Mather v. Rillston, 156 U.S. 391 (1895); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Jones, 294 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961); Hornberger, supra note 32, at 5.
122. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
123. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORTER REFERENCE FILE, supra note 21,
at 3102; see Secretary of Labor v. Vy Lactos Laboratories, Inc., 1 O.S.H.C. 1141
(1973). In Secretary of Labor v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 1 O.S.H.C. 1256
(1973), the Commission ruled that "recognized hazards" included those discoverable by
instruments. The modification of the general duty clause in terms of recognized hazards
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more than the common law duty since the employer must furnish a working
environment that is free from future, as well 'as present hazards, but it is obvi-
ous that in a civil suit the clause could be invoked only by one who could
establish an actual present injury. In effect, OSHA simply restates the em-
ployer's common law duty, even going so far as to make it applicable only
in cases where a specific standard does not apply. 124 The criticism which
has been levied against it for its vagueness 125 is equally 'applicable to the
elusive (reasonable man standard, so that the Act cannot be criticized for be-
ing unfairly ambiguous when it merely restates a commonly accepted, though
admittedly 'ambiguous, test applicable to all negligence cases. Since the gen-
eral duty clause embodies the reasonable man standard, however, a violation
of it should not be admitted in a civil suit, for by admitting it, the court would
be allowing the Compliance Officer, and perhaps the OSHRC, to determine
what conduct is -reasonable. In cases where the general duty clause applies,
the legislature did not fix the standard of care for a particular type of activity,
so it would 'be an invasion of the trier of fact's role to make -the general duty
clause binding in a civil suit.
As to the proper effect which a violation of a specific standard should have
in a civil suit, this is another instance where the standard has been legisla-
tively fixed and unreasonable activities have been anticipated. Employers
have the opportunity to challenge each regulation before it is promulgated,
and once it is published in the Federal Register, employers are charged with
constructive notice of its existence 'and terms. An employer might argue that
a given regulation either goes beyond or is totally unrelated to a reasonable
standard of care,' 26 but if this problem arises in a civil suit, it would be after
an injury occurred, 'and hence the employer would be placed in the unenvi-
able position of arguing that the deviation which caused the plaintiff's injury
was more reasonable than obedience to the rule which might have prevented
it. There will, however, be a substantial causation problem in this area.
Many of the regulations are rather trivial and it would not only be harsh,
but also absurd to base liability on 'the violation of the statute. 27 Further-
more, the extreme breadth of the Act makes it likely that a violation could
occur and lead to an accident before a reasonably prudent employer could
correct it. Finally, OSHA is ofiten -technical 'and confusing, but the employer
is unable to secure an advisory investigation to assure that he is in compliance
with the regulations. 128  Balancing these factors leads to the conclusion that
reflected a compromise between the administration version of OSHA, which was phrased
in terms of "readily apparent hazards," and the version authored by Congressman
Daniels, Chairman of the House Labor Subcommittee, which covered all hazards. See
3 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5177, 5222 (1970).
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c) (1973).
125. Rep. Steiger, co-author of OSHA, criticized the breadth and vagueness of the
general duty clause contained in the compromise version of the Act, arguing that it gave
insufficient notice to employers and that since it imposed penalties before injuries oc-
curred, it was not analogous to the tort duty. 116 CONG. REc. 38371 (1970).
126. See Morris, supra note 63, at 152.
127. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(c)(3)(iii) (1973), which requires toilets to
have hinged seats made of material with a nonabsorbent finish.
128. A bill to authorize such advisory investigations was presented to the Congress
by Rep. Steiger, but it apparently died in the Education and Labor Committee. H.R.
16508, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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the violation of a specific standard of OSHA should be some evidence of neg-
ligence for the jury to consider,129 but it should not constitute negligence per
se. By the same logic, compliance with the specific regulations of OSHA
should be a factor for the jury to consider, but it should by no means be
conclusive on the issue of reasonable conduct."30
The constitutional problems of OSHA13 must also be considered in deter-
mining what effect, if any, the evidence that an OSHA standard was violated
should have. As OSHA's penalties bring it within the category "quasi-
criminal"' 82 for purposes of the exclusionary rule, any materials seized uncon-
stitutionally, such 'as during a search without a warrant to which the employer
does not consent, would be excluded in 'an OSHA hearing. The problem
of concern here is what effect that exclusion should have in a civil action.
Though -there has not been much litigation on this point, the better reasoned
cases hold that in order to further the policies underlying ,the exclusion of
unconstitutionally seized evidence, this material will not be admissible 'in a
subsequent civil suit.' 33
As to the other constitutional problems of OSHA, those dealing with the
lack of due process and the chilling effect on appeals are crucial to an analy-
sis of the proper weight to be accorded an OSHA "conviction." W'hen the
system prevents the employer from pursuing his rights to the fullest possible
extent, and does not 'accord him due process protections, the further effect
of its adjudication should be diminished accordingly.
Next is the question of whether a private right of action should be implied
under the statute. Before applying the specific tests discussed above,134 it
is necessary to indicate 'that the statute itself appears to be determinative of
at least part of this question. Section 4(b)(4) of the Act states that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising
out of, or in the course of, employment. 3 5
Legislative history on this provision is virtually non-existent, but the provision
apparently denies a private right of -action if it is barred by workmen's com-
129. This approach unfortunately does not eliminate the very real possibility that
the jury will base its decision on the violation of the regulation, rather than on the un-
reasonableness of the action. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
130. See Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
131. See notes 39-52 supra and accompanying text.
132. For other cases of quasi-criminal statutes, see NLRB v. South Bay Daily
Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th
Cir. 1968) (FTC hearing); State v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391
(S.D. Iowa 1968) (civil antitrust action); Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 App.
Div. 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1966) (liquor license proceeding); Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Bd. v. Leonardziak, 210 Pa. Super. 511, 233 A.2d 606 (1967).
133. See, e.g., Kassner v. Fremont Mut. Ins. Co., 47 Mich. App. 264, 209 N.W.2d
490 (1973); Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
134. See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b) (4) (1970).
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pensation, but if such an action is not barred by workmen's compensation, 136
or where a third party is injured, the limiting language of section 4(b)(4)
as to employer-employee 'actions under a law should be irrelevant to the im-
plication of a private action.
Thus far, -three federal courts of appeals have held that OSHA does not
imply a private cause of action.* In Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc.187 the
Fourth Circuit pursued reasoning similar to that used by the Fifth Circuit in
Breitwieser v. KMS Industries, Inc.'38 The availability of workmen's com-
pensation would preclude a private remedy, at least as to employees. In
Skidmore v. Travelers Insurance Co.13 9 the Fifth Circuit alluded to the si-
lence of the statute in the area of private relief, but based its refusal to -impose
civil liability on the fact that the 'suit sought to fasten liability on executive
officers of a corporation, who, as employees themselves, were not responsible
for enforcing the provisions of OSHA.140  Finally, in Russell v. Bartley141
the Sixth Circuit adhered to 'a rather conservative view in refusing to imply
a private remedy because of the Congress' failure to mention civil liability
and because of the availability of workmen's compensation. 142 Also present
in Russell was the executive officer problem focused upon in Skidmore. If
this factor was actually central -to the decisions, the cases are of less preceden-
tial value 'as -to the implied private action than might otherwise be assumed,
for they might be unique to their own fact situations. Even if the cases can-
-not be so distinguished, they say 'nothing new or unexpected, but simply fol-
low the traditional tort analysis in construing intent and -analyzing available
remedies to deny a private remedy. At least as to employees whose employ-
ers subscribe -to workmen's compensation, the conclusions of these cases
seem appropriate.1 43
Though the implication of a private right of 'action for employees lies on
rather tenuous ground because of section 4(b)(4), the reasoning generally
applied to determine the appropriateness of such a remedy is applicable, for
it can support an implied right of action for injured third parties and in those
136. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 4 (1967) (covering non-sub-
scribing employers); id. § 5 (actions for exemplary damages in cases of gross negligence
or willful misconduct).
*Editor's Note: Since this Comment went to press, the Fifth Circuit decided in Jeter v.
St. Regis Paper Co., No. 73-3470 (5th Cir., Feb. 6, 1975), that OSHA provides no
federal cause of action to an employee of an independent contractor to whom the con-
tractor's employer owed no duty.
137. 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974).
138. 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972); see text accompanying note 94 supra.
139. 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
140. One commentator suggests that Skidmore should be limited to its facts, for it
simply held that OSHA does not create a private cause of action against executive offi-
cers when -the failure to comply was the employer's and not the officers'. See Stra-
mondo, Civil Litigation Potential of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
in PLI, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALT ACT-TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 211, 218(1974).
141. 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974).
142. The Congress was obviously concerned about improving the effectiveness of
workmen's compensation, for OSHA created a National Commission on State Work-
men's Compensation Laws. 29 U.S.C. § 676 (1970).
143. See also Hare v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 359 F. Supp. 214 (N.D.
Miss. 1973), where the court refused to base civil liability on the Act. The case in-
volved some special problems regarding the liability of the employer of an independent
contractor, so it is probably a limited precedent.
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cases section 4(b)(4) would appear to be irrelevant. These individuals are
not covered by workmen's compensation, yet their injuries are caused by dis-
obedience to a legislative mandate which was designed to prevent such in-
juries. Giving them a private remedy would further -the policies of the Act
by providing 'another incentive for employers to comply. Furthermore, the
agency charged with enforcement in this area is unable to provide -relief for
the injured third party, and if his injury is caused by the violation of a par-
ticular standard which sets a higher duty of care, then the reasonable man
standard, relegating him to his common law or state remedies, would in effect
leave him without relief. ,For ;these reasons, OSHA should be interpreted
to provide an implied right of action for ,third parties -against employers. 1 4 4
Finally, in the area of strict liability for 'a violation of OSHA and more
particularly, .the denial of the defenses of assumption of the risk iand contribu-
tory negligence, there 'appears to be no reason why this Act should be treated
any differently from the general pattern of disallowing the assumption of risk
defense but permitting that of contributory negligence. Were the assumption
of risk defense available, an employer could avoid his obligations to increase
safety on the job simply by making his employees aware of -the dangers. As
was stated by the Senate Committee, the employer has full responsibility for
job safety145 'and consequently should not be able contractually to avoid his
duty to provide safe working conditions for 'his employees.' 46 As a practical
matter, however, this is probably a relatively unimportant issue, for because
of the coverage of workmen's compensation, it is in only rare cases, usually
where gross negligence is involved, that an employee will be able to sue his
employer, 41 7 iand in those cases assumption of the risk should not be a signifi-
cant issue.
The contributory negligence defense, on the other hand, seems justified by
the terms of OSHA. As was stated recently by the OSHRC,148 OSHA does
not make the employer "a virtual insurer of the conduct of his employees"
nor is he "absolutely liable for all their acts of commission and omission.' 49
The employees are charged with specific duties under OSHA and the mere
fact that they are not subject to penalties for noncompliance does not indicate
that their 'negligence should be disregarded in a civil action. Once the em-
ployer "has established an effective safety program and has taken reasonable
steps to inform 'his employees of their obligations to comply with OSHA safety
standards and plant safety rules,"'15 'he should be able to utilize comparative
negligence or the contributory negligence defense to diminish or deny his lia-
bility -for unauthorized actions of 'his employees, both in administrative pro-
144. The Act might even be interpreted to provide a right of action by third parties
against employees who violate their duties under OSHA.
145. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
146. The employer would still be liable for penalties levied directly under the Act.
147. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (1967).
148. Secretary of Labor v. Richmond Block, Inc., 2 OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
119 (1972), aff'd, 1 O.S.H.C. 1505 (1974); accord, Secretary of Labor v. Hansen Bros.
Logging, 1 O.S.H.C. 1060 (1972); Secretary of Labor v. Standard Glass Co., 1 O.S.H.C.
1045 (1972).
149. 2 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. at 119. But see Secretary of Labor v. Cam
Indus., Inc., 1 O.S.H.C. 1564 (1974).
150. Lemert & Sours, supra note 36, at 31.
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ceedings 'under OSHA and in related civil matters. Such an approach would
encourage the employer to fulfill his obligations under the Act, but would
not place upon him 'the unfair burden of going beyond the reasonable man
standard in assuring that his employees comply. 51
IV. CONCLUSION
OSHA provides a striking means to determine the approach which should
be taken in all civil cases in which a party seeks to introduce evidence of
a statutory violation. That approach calls for the pursuit of a case-by-case
analysis which will -further the interests expressed in the statute without un-
fairly burdening a defendant. In order to determine whether the violation
should constitute negligence per se, some evidence of negligence, or no evi-
dence of 'negligence, the specific provisions of the Act, possible constitutional
or other objections to it, ,and its legislative history should be analyzed. The
intended protection of the statute, in -terms of the risk against which it was
designed and the class which it was to protect, should also be determined.
In cases where the plaintiff did not have an opportunity 'to discover his non-
compliance, the fairness of applying the negligence per se rule should be con-
sidered.
Further, as was exemplified by the above 'analysis of OSHA, the type of
adjudication which led to the defendant's being found liable under the statute
should be explored. If the "adjudication" was merely payment of a fine
without 'an adversarial determination of the issues, the violation of the statute
should probably be of no effect. If, on -the other hand, the defendant exer-
cised -full rights of appeal, complete with constitutional guarantees, a much
stronger case for negligence per se is presented. Along with this considera-
tion, however, the court should weigh the fact that by determining the subse-
quent effect according to the extent of appeal, it will be discouraging employ-
ers from exercising their rights to appeal.
The type of provision which is violated should also be 'analyzed. If it is
simply a restatement of the common law duty, as is the general duty clause
in OSHA, it should be of no effect in a civil suit. To allow such to be con-
sidered would be -to take from the fact finder the Tight to determine ,the rea-
sonable man standard. If the statute goes beyond the reasonable man stand-
ard, ,as do the specific standards in OSHA, and if causation is not a problem,
then the statute should be at least some evidence for -the jury to consider.
Under OSHA, since the employer might be genuinely unaware of a violation
and since he cannot secure an advisory opinion, it is submitted that the vio-
lation should constitute evidence of negligence, rather than negligence per se.
,In determining if 'a private right of action should be implied, the legislative
history, intended effect, and policies of the Act must be studied. Given the
difficulty in deriving legislative intent, the courts should emphasize the policy
151. The court applied comparative negligence in Arthur v. Flota Mercante Gran
Centro Americana, S.A., 487 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973), a case involving safety and
health regulations under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1970). The court also applied the classic risk and protected class
analysis to conclude that the violation constituted negligence per se.
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approach. When by implying a private remedy, the court would further the
goals of the statute wthout denying clear legislative intent to the contrary,
it should do so. Under OSHA, the legislative intent against establishing a
private remedy for employees seems clear, but as to third parties the Act and
legislative history are silent. To further the stated goals of diminishing the
number of job-related injuries, it would be appropriate for the court to imply
a private right -of action for third parties.
Finally, in determining if strict liability or a presumption of guilt with avail-
able defenses should be the rule, the courts should consider the effect which
each defense would have on the goals of the Act. In OSHA, assumption
of the risk would allow the employer to evade his responsibilities, but contrib-
utory negligence would be an appropriate defense if the employee failed to
observe his duty of compliance. By pursuing this specific yet flexible ap-
proach, courts may give violations of statutes like OSHA an important and
logical effect in civil litigation.
